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The defense and aviation industries play a significant role in Oklahoma’s 
economy.  In the last three years alone, at least $155 million in defense 
contracts have been awarded to Oklahoma-based companies, signaling an 
increase in defense research and development in the state.1  According to 
the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, aerospace-related companies 
accounted for 6.2% of Oklahoma’s exports in 2010.2  Notably, Oklahoma’s 
total exports grew more than 20% between 2006 and 2010.3  Defense 
contractors and aerospace-related companies generally provide services, 
aircrafts, equipment or other defense items to purchasers.  Before these 
companies can sell their items or services internationally or expose their 
technology to many foreign nationals, they must obtain a license from one 
of several executive agencies.4  
The U.S. system of export controls prohibits or limits the export of items 
or services that could detrimentally affect national security or U.S. foreign 
                                                                                                                 
* The author wishes to thank Michael Scaperlanda, Professor of Law at the University of 
Oklahoma College of Law, and Gretta Rowold, Executive Director of Secure Research 
Operations at the University of Oklahoma, for their advice and encouragement during the 
writing of this note. 
1. In 2009, the U.S. Marines awarded an Oklahoma-based defense contractor a $61 million 
contract to manufacture tactical vehicle trailers. See Choctaw Manufacturing Development 
Corporation, OKLA. DEP’T OF COM. (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.okcommerce.gov/ 
Commerce/About/rc/Choctaw-Manufacturing-Development-corporation-Awarded-$61-Million-
Defense-Contract. In 2010, a university research branch in Oklahoma was awarded a $44 million 
contract from the U.S. Navy to develop unmanned aerial vehicle technology. See OSU Receives 
$44 Million Contract for Unmanned Aerial Systems, OKLA. STATE UNIV. (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://news.okstate.edu/index.php/press-releases/511-osu-receives-44-million-contract-for-unman 
ned-aerial-systems.  Moreover in 2011, the U.S. Air Force awarded an Oklahoma City-based 
defense contractor a major subcontract worth up to $50 million to train personnel on the world’s 
largest aircraft, the C-5 galaxy.  See Jay F. Marks, City Business Lands Contract, THE 
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1.   
2. OKLA. DEP’T OF COM., 2010 OKLAHOMA EXPORT REPORT 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.okcommerce.gov/Libraries/Documents/2010-Oklahoma-Exports-Overview-1_3263.pdf. 
3. Id. at 6. 
4. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009) (listing articles, services, and technical data 
regulated by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls). 
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policy.  Although these are legitimate concerns, exporters can be 
unwittingly entangled in the system.  Exporters navigating the numerous 
regulations can have difficulty determining which agency to consult and 
whether a license is required at all.  Some exporters may not even know 
that such regulations exist.  Regardless, the U.S. export control system 
expects industry insiders to comprehend and adhere to applicable 
regulations. 
In August 2010, President Obama introduced the groundwork for 
sweeping changes in the U.S. export control system, intending to reinforce 
national security while increasing U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing 
and technology.5  The changes came in the wake of an interagency review 
that recognized the disparate approaches of the primary export licensing 
agencies.6  The review noted jurisdictional disputes between regulatory 
agencies arising from an inconsistency and lack of transparency in agency 
decisions.7 
As part of the changes, the President introduced a new webpage to aid 
exporters in navigating export controls and planning international sales.8  
The changes also included a proposed revision of Category VII of the 
United States Munitions List (Munitions List), the list of defense articles 
and services governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR).9  This revision is the first attempt at transforming the categorical 
Munitions List to a “positive” list.10   
Presently, the Munitions List includes twenty-one broad categories with 
subjective criteria—making it difficult to ascertain whether an item fits a 
category.11  A positive list will apply new objective criteria and provide 
                                                                                                                 
5. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Lays the Foundation for 
a New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the Competitiveness of 





8. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces First Steps 
toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System (Dec. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-first-
steps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor [hereinafter December Press Release].  
9. Id.; see also Revisions to United States Munitions List, 75 Fed. Reg. 76935 (Dec. 10, 
2010) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 121.1). 
10. December Press Release, supra note 8. 
11. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009); December Press Release, supra note 8. 
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clarity to exporters.12  By revising the Munitions List into a positive list of 
items and services that fit published criteria, thereby helping exporters 
decide more easily if an item is controlled, the executive branch hopes to 
eliminate jurisdictional disputes between agencies.13   
These changes may also reduce the number of executive agency 
decisions subject to judicial review.  The most divisive issues surrounding 
arms export violations include the lack of procedural safeguards in the 
regulations and judicial review of agency designations of defense items.  
The regulations, even with the reforms, create the possibility of 
unintentional criminal violations.  Newcomers to international trade, 
especially from smaller companies, are likely unaware of the federal 
licensing requirements.  Although the government must show that an 
exporter willfully violated the regulations,14 what constitutes a “willful” 
violation of the regulations remains widely debated.  The present circuit 
split15 regarding procedural safeguards and judicial review of defense item 
designations necessitates either amended legislation or guidance from the 
Supreme Court. 
This note examines United States v. Pulungan, a recent appellate court 
decision involving the Munitions List.16  This decision revealed a definite 
reluctance by the Seventh Circuit to favor broad regulatory power free from 
judicial review when the executive agency decision lacked transparency— 
subjecting exporters to the whims of an unchecked, unelected agency. This 
note focuses on understanding the regulation of defense articles and 
services by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).  Part II 
summarizes the legislative history of export controls and case law prior to 
the Seventh Circuit decision.  Part III discusses the facts and issues 
addressed in United States v. Pulungan.  Part IV presents the holding and 
Part V analyzes how the decision appropriately increased pressure on the 
DDTC to operate with more transparency and how the court correctly 
                                                                                                                 
12. December Press Release, supra note 8. 
13. Id. 
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2010). 
15. Compare United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Murphy, 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); and United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 
(9th Cir. 1976) (applying a broad interpretation of “willfully”), with United States v. Smith, 
918 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Adames, 878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989); and 
United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying a narrow interpretation 
of “willfully”). 
16. United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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exercised judicial review and applied a narrow definition of willfulness.  
This note concludes with Part VI. 
II. The History of Export Controls 
A. An Explanation of Present Regulatory Agency Roles 
An exploration of export controls unavoidably begins with decoding the 
barrage of acronyms governing the trade of items that could detrimentally 
affect U.S. foreign policy or national security.  The responsibility for 
implementing export controls is dispersed among several administrative 
agencies.  These agencies decide whether an item may be exported, where 
the item may be exported, and who may receive the item. 
Within the United States Department of State, the DDTC regulates the 
export of defense articles and services that have primarily military 
purposes.17  The DDTC governs the export and temporary import of these 
defense items through the ITAR.18  These regulations contain the presently 
categorical list of export-controlled defense items that constitute the 
Munitions List.19 
Within the United States Department of Commerce, the Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) regulates the export of commercial items and 
“dual use” technologies and products through the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR).20  “Dual use” items are those “that have both 
commercial and military or proliferation applications,” such that the trade 
of these items prompts national security concerns.21  The primary list of the 
items regulated by the EAR is the Commerce Control List (CCL),22 which 
is more objective and positive than the Munitions List.   
Within the United States Department of Treasury, the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) enforces national sanctions against other countries 
and monitors trade restrictions on suspected criminals.23  Unlike the DDTC 
                                                                                                                 
17. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2009). 
18. Id. §§ 120-130.  DDTC only has authority over temporary imports, which are by 
definition “exports” because they will leave the country at some point.  See id. § 120.18.  
Permanent imports are under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives. See 27 C.F.R. § 447.1 (2010). 
19. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2010).  As part of the changes 
to the export control system, the DDTC is revising this list into a positive list.  See 
December Press Release, supra note 8. 
20. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(a) (2011).   
21. Id. § 772.1. 
22. Id. § 774.1.  
23. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www. 
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and BIS, OFAC generally focuses on the geographical destination of an 
item rather than the nature of the item itself. For instance, OFAC has 
imposed comprehensive sanctions upon Burma, Cuba, Iran, and Sudan.24   
The DDTC, BIS, and OFAC comprise only a portion of the alphabet 
soup of agencies that govern foreign trade.  Unsurprisingly, both 
experienced exporters and novices encounter great difficulty navigating the 
complex maze of lists and regulations these agencies create.   
B. The History and Purpose of the AECA 
In 1976, Congress passed the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which 
granted the president authority to control the trade and licensing of 
defense articles and services.25 President Ford delegated this authority to 
the U.S. Department of State.26  Through this delegation, the DDTC is 
authorized to designate which items constitute the Munitions List, the list 
of defense items subject to export regulations.27  A defense item is an 
article or service without a predominantly civilian application that “[i]s 
specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a 
military application . . . .”28   
Importantly, the Munitions List specifies twenty-one categories of items 
rather than a list of each individual item subject to control.29  The DDTC 
determines the published categories and designates whether a specific item 
falls within a category.30 An item designated on the Munitions List may not 
be exported or temporarily imported without a license from the DDTC.31  
Any person who willfully exports designated defense items without a 
license violates these regulations and may be subject to a fine up to 
$1,000,000 and up to twenty years’ imprisonment.32  The DDTC’s power to 
publish categories without judicial review is uncontested, but whether the 
designation of an item as fitting a category is subject to judicial review 
remains open for debate. 
                                                                                                                 
treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/index.shtml (last accessed Jan. 15, 2011). 
24. Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#9 (last accessed Mar. 29, 
2011). 
25. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2010). 
26. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977). 
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). 
28. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3(a) (2010). 
29. See id. § 121.1. 
30. See id. § 121.1(a); see also infra Part II.C. 
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2). 
32. Id. § 2778(c). 
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Munitions List designations is 
the DDTC’s claimed freedom from judicial review and rule-making 
procedures.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which outlines 
procedures for rule-making by executive agencies, applies to agency 
decisions unless the regulations involve “a military or foreign affairs 
function of the United States” or another expressed exception.33  The 
AECA does not expressly state that the designation of an item is a foreign 
affairs function exception to the APA, but it does expressly exclude 
published regulations from judicial review.34  The AECA declares, “[t]he 
designation by the President (or by an official to whom the President’s 
functions . . . have been duly delegated), in regulations issued under this 
section, of items as defense articles or defense services for purposes of this 
section shall not be subject to judicial review.”35  The DDTC asserts that 
the AECA involves a foreign affairs function because it permits the agency 
to monitor trade of defense items with the purpose of furthering world 
peace and security.36  Consequently, the DDTC considers the designation of 
a particular item to a Munitions List category as exempt from APA rule-
making procedures and judicial review.37  As this note will discuss, some 
circuit courts interpret the AECA as allowing judicial review of 
unpublished Munitions List designations. 
What exactly constitutes a foreign affairs function exemption from the 
APA is not fully defined in legislative history.  In 1947, one year after 
President Truman signed the APA into law, the Attorney General released a 
manual to aid government agencies and the general public in interpreting 
the APA.38  The Attorney General construed the exemption as applying to 
most actions of the State Department.39  The manual referenced Senate and 
House Reports that declined exempting all overseas functions, and instead 
limited the exemption to “those ‘affairs’ which so affect relations with other 
governments that, for example, public rule making provisions would clearly 
provoke definitely undesirable international consequences.”40  Using this 
                                                                                                                 
33. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2010). 
34. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778. 
35. Id. § 2778(h) (emphasis added). 
36. 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2010). 
37. Id.  
38. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/ 
references/reference_works/agtc.htm. 
39. Id. at 27. 
40. Id. at 26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 752, at 13 (1946), and H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 23 
(1946)). 
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interpretation, if requiring the DDTC to conform to the APA rule-making 
procedures would provoke undesirable international consequences, then 
creating Munitions List categories is exempt from judicial review as a 
foreign affairs function.   
The Supreme Court has not addressed the definition of a foreign affairs 
function or whether implementing the ITAR is a foreign affairs function 
exempt from APA rule-making procedures.  The United States Court of 
International Trade (CIT) has addressed this issue.  According to the CIT, 
judges must narrowly construe whether the regulations “clearly and 
directly” entail a “foreign affairs function.”41  To determine a foreign affairs 
function exemption, the CIT examines the function of an agency regulation, 
not the document granting the agency authority.42  Under this approach, the 
function of the ITAR, not the authority granted by the AECA, determines 
whether or not implementing the ITAR is exempt from the APA rule-
making procedures.  The DDTC lists the function of the ITAR as executing 
“[t]he statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations with 
respect to exports of defense articles and defense services . . . .”43  
Regulating defense exports almost certainly entails a foreign affairs 
function, but it remains debatable whether or not promulgating those 
regulations through APA public rule-making provisions, such as advance 
notice and an opportunity to comment,44 would have negative international 
consequences.   
C. Judicial Review of DDTC Designations 
Only a few circuit courts have addressed whether Munitions List 
designations are exempt from APA rule-making procedures and judicial 
review.  Most of the discussion arises within vagueness challenges to the 
AECA.   
In United States v. Zheng, the Third Circuit chose to defer to the DDTC 
rather than review its decision to place an item on the Munitions List.45  The 
defendants were charged with violating the ITAR by exporting wave tube 
amplifiers to China without a license.46  The DDTC asserted that the 
amplifiers fell under “active and passive countermeasures” within Category 
                                                                                                                 
41. Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 214, 231 (1984).  
42. Id. at 230. 
43. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2010). 
44. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2010). 
45. United States v. Zheng, 768 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1985).  
46. Id. at 519.  Wave tube amplifiers are a type of radar jamming device.  See United 
States v. Zheng, 590 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.C.N.J. 1984). 
846 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:839 
 
 
XI of the Munitions List.47 The defendants argued that the broad category 
created by the DDTC failed to satisfy the AECA requirement of designating 
export-controlled “items.”48  The district court agreed with the defendants 
and determined that “countermeasures” did not constitute “items.”49  The 
district court reasoned that Congress meant “to obtain greater particularity 
in the Munitions List so as to facilitate congressional oversight and 
‘increase the quality of notice available to potential exporters.’”50  The 
appellate court disagreed.  Instead, the Third Circuit gave the DDTC wide 
latitude in designating which items fell into the broad Munitions List 
category.51 The court found that the DDTC’s assertion that wave amplifiers 
were “countermeasures” was alone sufficient to make them subject to 
licensing requirements.52 
In United States v. Gregg, the Eighth Circuit also favored agency 
discretion over judicial interference in export controls.53  A jury found the 
appellant guilty of unlawfully exporting controlled items, including:  night 
vision goggles, military aircraft communication radios, components of a 
missile system, and a tactical air navigational radio system.54  Gregg was 
also convicted for exporting items on the CCL, which is governed by the 
EAR.55  The appellant contended that both of the regulations, the ITAR and 
EAR, were unconstitutionally vague.56  The Eighth Circuit recognized that 
Congress granted the executive branch discretion to weigh policy objectives 
for export controls.57  The court explained that even if the policy objectives 
were vague, the government did not need to justify them.58  The 
government only needed to prove that the items were on the Munitions List 
and that the defendant possessed the requisite level of intent.59   
The court cited a district court decision stressing that Congress “clearly 
expressed its desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final 
                                                                                                                 
47. Zheng, 768 F.2d at 519. 
48. Id. at 521. 
49. Id. at 520. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 523. 
52. Id. at 524. 
53. United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987). 
54. Id. at 1433. 
55. Id. 




2012] NOTES 847 
 
 
word on which items should be restricted.”60  This district court decision, 
however, discussed the congressional intent behind the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, not the Arms Export Control Act.61  The 
Eighth Circuit relied upon the former and extended the same congressional 
intent to violations of the AECA without any legislative history to support 
this extension.62 
D. Proving Willfulness for a Criminal Violation of the AECA 
Exempting Munitions List designations from the APA rule-making 
procedures and judicial review has raised serious issues in proving the 
requisite level of intent for AECA violations.  Some courts have concluded 
that vagueness arguments due to lack of notice are defeated by the specific 
intent requirement of AECA.63  For instance, in United States v. Hsu, the 
Fourth Circuit found that the AECA was not unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the defendants.64 In this case, the defendants were convicted for 
conspiring and attempting to unlawfully export military encryption devices 
to China.65  The question on appeal was whether the defendants “in fact had 
fair notice that the statute and regulations proscribed their conduct.”66  The 
defendants argued that the Munitions List was unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to them because it did not clarify that the specific devices they 
attempted to export qualified as “military” devices.67 The court stressed that 
the AECA’s requirement of willfulness counteracts most as-applied 
vagueness challenges to the AECA because the requirement that a 
defendant must willfully violate the regulations protects the innocent 
exporter who unknowingly exports a controlled item.68  Here, the 
defendants were repeatedly told beforehand that they needed a license to 
export in order to avoid illegal activity; therefore, they lost their vagueness 
challenge because the government proved willfulness.69   
The mens rea for a criminal violation of the AECA is not absolutely 
clear.  The law states that “[a]ny person who willfully violates any 
                                                                                                                 
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550, 553 (D. Mass. 
1983)). 
61. See Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. at 553. 
62. See Gregg, 829 F.2d at 1437. 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2004). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 196. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 197. 
69. Id. at 198. 
848 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:839 
 
 
provision” of the AECA is subject to criminal prosecution.70  The circuit 
courts, however, have not agreed upon a consistent interpretation of 
“willfully.”   
The most detailed Supreme Court discussion of the definition of 
“willfully” is in Bryan v. United States.  This case interpreted a different, 
but analogous, federal statute.71  The petitioner illegally dealt in firearms 
without a license.72  The Court determined that within the federal weapons 
licensing statute, “willfully” only required knowledge of unlawful conduct 
and did not allow an exception for ignorance of the law.73  The Court 
acknowledged that certain regulations are so complicated that they risk 
“ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” yet the 
Court did not see the risk of ensnaring individuals by requiring a weapons 
license.74  The Court noted, however, that ignorance of the law may be a 
defense when apparently innocent activity is governed by highly technical 
statutes.75   
Justice Scalia objected to the generality of the majority opinion in Bryan.  
In his dissent, he expressed concern “that the defendant must be ignorant of 
every law violated . . . to be innocent of willfully violating the licensing 
requirement.”76  If “willfully” only requires knowledge that conduct is 
unlawful, knowledge of any unlawful conduct, even conduct not addressed 
by the statute, could result in a criminal conviction under an ambiguous 
statute.77  Justice Scalia’s dissent articulated the dangers and frustrations 
resulting from a broad definition of “willfully.”78  
In cases involving the AECA, the government generally argues for a 
broad definition of “willfully” on the grounds that the AECA does not 
present a danger of ensnaring innocent individuals.  On the other hand, 
alleged violators argue that this danger is present because the categorical 
Munitions List remains too broad to put exporters on notice that their 
specific items might be subject to licensing requirements.  They argue that 
without objective criteria for what constitutes a defense item, the 
regulations risk ensnaring innocent individuals.  They promote the creation 
                                                                                                                 
70. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2010). 
71. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). 
72. Dealing in firearms without a license is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) 
(1996). 
73. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 196. 
74. Id. at 194.   
75. Id. at 195. 
76. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
77. Id. at 202. 
78. Id. 
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of a positive list, rather than the current categorical list. Apparently, the 
present administration has finally reacted.79 
Several federal circuit court cases have followed the majority’s reasoning 
in Bryan, but some circuits have heeded the concerns Justice Scalia 
expressed in his dissent.  As discussed below, similarly to Bryan, the First, 
Third, and Ninth Circuits use a broad definition of “willfully.”  The Second, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits apply a narrower definition.  Prior to its 
decision in Pulungan, the Seventh Circuit applied the broad definition in 
United States v. Beck.80  There, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the need to 
show knowledge of the licensing requirement, but required proof “that the 
defendant was aware of a legal duty not to export the articles.”81  
1. Federal Circuits Applying a Broad Definition of “Willfully” 
In United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
willfulness requirement for a violation of 22 U.S.C. § 1934, the predecessor 
to the AECA.82  The defendant was found guilty of illegally attempting to 
export ammunition to Mexico, but the jury was given a general intent 
instruction.83  On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a 
specific intent jury instruction.84  The Ninth Circuit required the specific 
intent instruction, and interpreted “willfully” as requiring proof of “a 
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty not to export the 
proscribed articles.”85  This decision paved the way for courts to apply a 
broad definition of “willfully” when interpreting the AECA. 
The First Circuit upheld a conviction of conspiracy to export firearms 
without a license in United States v. Murphy.86  The defendants argued that 
“willfully” meant the government must prove that defendants knew of the 
licensing requirement and knew the items were on the Munitions List.87  
Citing Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the court required proof of specific intent.88  
The only evidence offered to show that the firearms were on the Munitions 
List was testimony from a DDTC official asserting that they fit a category 
                                                                                                                 
79. See December Press Release, supra note 8. 
80. See United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 1980). 
81. Id.  
82. See United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976). 
83. Id. at 827. 
84. Id. at 828. 
85. Id. at 829; see also United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988). 
86. See Murphy, 852 F.2d at 2. 
87. Id. at 6. 
88. Id. at 7.   
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and required a license for export to Ireland.89  Nevertheless, the court ruled 
against the defendant and interpreted “willfully” as requiring the 
government to prove only that the defendant “knew he had a legal duty not 
to export the weapons.”90  The court did not require proof that the defendant 
knew about the ITAR or that the items were on the Munitions List.91 
In United States v. Tsai, the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction for violating the AECA by exporting components of military 
equipment to Taiwan without a license.92  The components were infrared 
domes that function as a windshield for military missiles.93  The 
government offered testimony from a missile system developer, testimony 
from an advisor to the President on missile systems, and the certification of 
the State Department to prove that the infrared domes required a license for 
export.94  The defendant claimed he did not think that the domes required a 
license for export because they could be used on helicopters rather than 
missile systems.95  He argued the evidence was insufficient to prove the 
domes fit Category IV(h) of the Munitions List, which requires a license for 
components and parts of guided missile systems.96  The Third Circuit 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the government must prove the 
defendant knew about the license requirement.97  The court determined that 
the defendant could be found guilty if he “knew that the export was 
illegal.”98 
2. Federal Circuits Applying a Narrow Definition of “Willfully” 
Other federal circuit courts require something more than mere violation 
of a known legal duty.  For instance, the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits seem to require that the defendant have at least some knowledge of 
the applicable licensing requirements.99  These circuits apply a narrower 
definition of “willfully.”   
                                                                                                                 
89. Id.  
90. Id.  
91. Id. 
92. See United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1992). 
93. Id. at 158. 
94. Id. at 158-59. 
95. Id. at 159. 
96. Id. at 159-60. 
97. See id. at 161. 
98. Id. at 162. 
99. See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Adames, 
878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring specific intent to violate the statute); United States 
v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring specific intent when items are 
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In United States v. Smith, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to 
violate the AECA by illegally exporting helicopters to the Middle East.100  
The Second Circuit upheld the conviction and approved jury instructions 
requiring “that defendant must have known that the helicopters to be 
exported were subject to the licensing requirements of the Arms Export 
Control Act and that he intended to export them in a manner inconsistent 
therewith.”101  Under this court’s rationale, mere knowledge that he was 
doing something generally unlawful would prove insufficient to support an 
AECA violation. 
The Fifth Circuit not only requires something more than knowledge of 
illegal activity, but also allows ignorance of the law as a defense.102  In 
United States v. Hernandez, the court reversed two of the three AECA 
convictions and explained, “While it is true that Hernandez’ concealment of 
the weapons possibly supported a jury finding that he knew his conduct was 
unlawful, . . . such a finding falls short of deciding that he knew he was 
unlawfully exporting weapons on the Munitions List.”103 The court reversed 
the decision because the lower court failed to instruct the jury on the 
relevance of ignorance of the law.  
In United States v. Adames, the Eleventh Circuit cited the broad Ninth 
Circuit approach to elucidate the requirement of willfulness, but the court 
required a higher level of proof to demonstrate an intentional violation of 
the AECA.104  The court stated, “Though it reasonably could be inferred 
from Adames’ suspicious conduct that she was aware of the generally 
unlawful nature of her actions, that state of mind is insufficient to sustain a 
finding of guilt under a statute requiring specific intent.”105  The Eleventh 
Circuit cited cases supporting the broad interpretation, but the court actually 
applied a narrow interpretation.   
Although the Eighth Circuit resists judicial review of Munitions List 
designations, in United States v. Gregg, it required the highest degree of 
knowledge to prove willfulness.106  General knowledge of unlawful conduct 
was not enough to find a willful violation.  At the time of export, the 
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defendant must have known that the items were on the Munitions List and 
that they required a license for export.107  The Seventh Circuit seems to be 
shifting towards this approach.  Although the Seventh Circuit did not 
require the government to meet as high a burden as the Eighth Circuit 
required, the decision in Pulungan indicates that proving general 
knowledge of unlawful conduct will not suffice for a criminal violation of 
the AECA. 
III. United States v. Pulungan:  The Seventh Circuit Allows Judicial Review 
and Applies a Narrower Definition of “Willfully” 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 2007, Doli Pulungan attempted to export 100 Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T 
riflescopes through Saudi Arabia to Indonesia.108  These optical sights 
attach to both tactical and competitive shooting rifles.109  Pulungan claimed 
that he avoided shipping directly to Indonesia because the United States had 
imposed an embargo on defense exports to Indonesia.110  Although an 
embargo on Indonesia existed between 1999 and 2005, no embargo existed 
when Pulungan tried to export the riflescopes.111   
The Munitions List includes a category of riflescopes as defense items 
requiring a license for export, specifically “riflescopes manufactured to 
military specifications.”112 Thus, Pulungan was charged with conspiring to 
export defense articles without a license in violation of the AECA.113  At 
trial, Pulungan conceded that he attempted to export the riflescopes without 
a license, but argued that the riflescopes are not “manufactured to military 
specifications.”114  Furthermore, because the regulation in 22 C.F.R. §121.1 
does not expressly say, “Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescope,” he refused to 
concede that this riflescope fit the Munitions List category.115  Furthermore, 
even if the Leupold riflescopes do adhere to military specifications, he 
claimed that he did not willfully violate the AECA.116 
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Through testimony from a DDTC official, the government asserted that 
the riflescopes fit the Munitions List category.117  While testifying, 
however, the official did not disclose the criteria for the designation nor 
why the DDTC believes the Leupold riflescopes adhere to military 
specifications.118  Rather than require the DDTC official to explain its 
reasoning, the trial judge determined, as a matter of law under the AECA, 
that the riflescopes were “manufactured to military specifications . . . .” 119   
In order to prove that Pulungan acted willfully, the government presented 
three pieces of evidence.  First, the prosecution presented Pulungan’s 
printouts of a website where the riflescopes could be purchased.120  The 
website included notifications that the riflescopes could only be shipped to 
certain countries, but it did not explain why the destinations were limited.121  
Second, the prosecution offered evidence that Pulungan lied to his 
suppliers.122  He made inconsistent statements about where he intended to 
ship the riflescopes, how willing he was to pay over market-value, and how 
many he intended to purchase.123  Finally, the prosecution presented email 
messages and notes from Pulungan indicating that he knew he could not 
legally ship to Indonesia.124   
The jury found Doli Pulungan guilty of conspiring to export defense 
articles without a license.125 He was sentenced to forty-eight months in 
prison, but he appealed to the Seventh Circuit.126   
B. Issues 
The Seventh Circuit considered two primary issues on appeal: (1) 
whether the DDTC designation of the riflescopes was subject to judicial 
review, and (2) whether sufficient evidence showed Pulungan acted 
willfully.  First, the court addressed whether Pulungan was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury when the district court refused to allow the 
jury to question the propriety of the DDTC’s designation of the riflescope 
as a defense item.127  Second, the court considered whether the evidence 
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was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pulungan acted 
willfully to violate the AECA.128  In reversing the trial court, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the government failed to establish that the defendant knew 
the riflescopes were designated on the Munitions List and subject to the 
licensing requirement.129   
IV. Decision of the Case 
The Seventh Circuit began by recognizing the benefits of a categorical 
Munitions List rather than an enumeration of every possible item.130  A list 
identifying attributes of controlled items rather than names avoids the risk 
of manufacturers changing names of products in order to bypass 
regulations.131  Although a categorical list may prove sensible, the court 
applied a strict interpretation of the text of the AECA, exempting only 
designations articulated “in regulations” from judicial review.132   
Pulungan never contested the DDTC’s authority to include “riflescopes 
manufactured to military specifications” in the regulations.133  Congress 
clearly granted the President authority to create the categories in the 
Munitions List.134 Rather, he argued, and the court agreed, that the DDTC’s 
assertion that the Leupold riflescopes fit the category was reviewable.135  
Specifically, “Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescope” was not listed under that 
category in the Munitions List, so the DDTC designation of these 
riflescopes as “defense articles” was subject to review.136  
The court explained that allowing the DDTC to designate items without 
any known criteria and without the possibility of review would raise serious 
constitutional issues.137  The government must prove through more than an 
assertion that the items fit the regulations.138  Chief Judge Easterbrook aptly 
noted, “A designation by an unnamed official, using unspecified criteria, 
that is put in a desk drawer, taken out only for use at a criminal trial, and 
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immune from any evaluation by the judiciary, is the sort of tactic usually 
associated with totalitarian régimes.”139 
Even if the government could have proven the riflescopes are controlled 
defense articles, the government could not prove that Pulungan knew they 
were on the Munitions List or that he willfully attempted to illegally export 
them.140  The government stipulated that the standard “willfully” required 
proof that Pulungan knew the riflescopes were on the Munitions List and 
that it was illegal to export them without a license.141  Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted “willfully” in the AECA as requiring knowledge of the 
ITAR rather than some other regulation.142  This narrow interpretation 
departs from the broad definition of “willfully” applied by the Seventh 
Circuit in Beck.143  
Although the government presented several pieces of evidence, the court 
found this evidence insufficient to prove intent to violate the licensing 
requirements beyond a reasonable doubt.144 The printouts of websites found 
in Pulungan’s possession indicated that the riflescopes could not be 
exported outside the U.S. but they did not give a reason for this limitation 
or indicate that a license was required.145  Pulungan had no reason to 
believe the limitation was due to a DDTC regulation, as the limitation could 
have been self-imposed by the manufacturer or distributor.146  In order to 
show that Pulungan knew his conduct was unlawful, the government 
presented proof that Pulungan lied about how much he was willing to pay 
and how many riflescopes he wanted to purchase.147  The government also 
presented email messages from Pulungan indicating that he knew exporting 
items to Indonesia was illegal.148  The court decided this evidence reflected 
Pulungan’s belief in an embargo rather than his knowledge of the license 
requirement for defense items.149 His intent to evade a non-existent 
embargo did not transfer to a willful intent to violate the AECA by 
exporting riflescopes without a license.150   
                                                                                                                 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 329. 
141. Id. at 331. 
142. Id. 
143. See United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 1980). 
144. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 331. 
145. Id. at 330. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 329. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 330. 
150. Id. at 330-31. 
856 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:839 
 
 
V. The Seventh Circuit Reached the Correct Decision in Reviewing the 
Ambiguity of DDTC Designations and Applying a Narrow Definition of 
Willfulness for an AECA Violation 
The ambiguous scope of the ITAR has a stifling effect on U.S. 
participation in international trade.  The present regulation system increases 
the likelihood of unintentional violations by reasonably diligent exporters.  
Since Pulungan admittedly tried to avoid U.S. embargo laws,151 he would 
likely not be considered a reasonably diligent exporter.  Still, his case 
reflects the possibility of unintentional violations of U.S. export laws.  
Potential exporters are understandably reluctant to engage in business when 
the possibility of a product being designated on the Munitions List without 
any advanced notice could conceivably lead to a civil penalty or criminal 
conviction.   
Although national security is an essential consideration for export 
controls, expanding trade and preserving procedural due process should 
also be considered in export control reforms.  The court in Pulungan 
correctly recognized the potential for due process violations, allowed 
review of DDTC designations of items, and applied a narrow definition of 
willfulness for an AECA criminal violation.  Chief Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion reflects the need for more transparency in DDTC designations and 
pressures the Supreme Court to address the disparity among circuits in 
defining willfulness within the AECA. 
A. Requiring More Proof Than a DDTC Assertion Alone 
The Seventh Circuit expressed obvious discomfort in allowing the 
DDTC unfettered authority.152  As a result of the DDTC’s interpretation 
that Munitions List designations are exempt from the APA procedures, the 
government has previously enjoyed great flexibility in determining and 
publicizing designations.  The DDTC has consistently made designations 
and then claimed that its decisions are immune from judicial review.153  
From a legal perspective, this makes it difficult for exporters to challenge 
DDTC designations or to know what alterations might be applied to items 
to avoid burdensome licensing requirements.  The Seventh Circuit rejected 
the notion that, as an executive agency, the DDTC can claim its 
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designations are a foreign affairs function and thus have immunity from 
judicial review. 
The primary problem is that DDTC designations frequently fail to 
provide sufficient notice for exporters.  For example, the DDTC did not 
publicize its decision that Leupold Mark CQ/T riflescopes are covered by 
the Munitions List.  Pulungan did not ask the DDTC or the manufacturer if 
the riflescopes at issue were on the Munitions List, so he lacked sufficient 
notice of the designation.154  The court explained that since Pulungan was 
not an industry insider, he had no reason to know that he should ask about 
the Munitions List.155  As a result of Pulungan’s victory, the Seventh 
Circuit pressured the DDTC to be more transparent and proactive regarding 
Munitions List designations.  
Furthermore, Pulungan reduced the responsibility for an exporter to 
utilize commodity jurisdiction requests to determine whether goods are 
export-controlled by the Department of State.  The ITAR provides a method 
for Munitions List inquiries through commodity jurisdiction.156  If 
manufacturers or exporters are unsure whether an item is covered by the 
Munitions List, commodity jurisdiction allows the manufacturer to request 
a decision by the DDTC.157  Commodity jurisdiction, however, is only 
helpful if the exporter knows that it is available.  Pulungan may reduce the 
impact of commodity jurisdiction procedures and weaken the government’s 
ability to prove knowledge of the regulations.  Without compelling 
individuals to inquire into Munitions List designations prior to export, the 
Seventh Circuit ruling makes it more difficult for the government to prove 
knowledge of the law. 
In order to avoid similar, unfavorable decisions, the DDTC should 
change its method of disseminating information.  Unless Munitions List 
designations and criteria are proactively publicized, the DDTC will likely 
face more challenges when items do not clearly fit Munitions List 
categories, and DDTC designations will be more susceptible to judicial 
review.  The Pulungan decision rejects the notion that an executive agency 
can assume that whatever it asserts is conclusive and unreviewable. 
B. Applying a Narrower Definition of “Willfully” 
The circuit courts have attempted to outline what the government must 
prove to show an intentional violation of the AECA, but the inconsistency 
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across circuits has only complicated matters. Pulungan adds to this 
inconsistency and requires more evidence from the government to prove a 
willful violation of the AECA.  Unlike some circuits, the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that a mistaken belief that conduct is unlawful falls short of proving 
an intentional violation of the licensing requirement.158  The Pulungan court 
stressed that willfulness in a regulatory offense requires knowledge of “this 
rule,” referring to the Munitions List in the ITAR, rather than knowledge of 
any other potential regulation.159  Since the DDTC designation of the 
riflescopes as export-controlled was unknown to the general public until 
Pulungan’s trial, the government could not prove that Pulungan knew of the 
regulation before he violated it.160   
The Seventh Circuit decision bolsters circuit courts that have applied a 
narrow definition of willfulness, requiring more than mere knowledge of 
unlawful conduct.161  The circuit split is decidedly more pronounced with 
the addition of the Seventh Circuit applying a narrower definition of 
“willfully,” along with the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
C. Using Pulungan as Persuasive Authority in Other Federal Circuits 
The Pulungan decision has been utilized in subsequent arguments by 
defendants claiming that the government cannot prove an intentional 
violation of the AECA. In Pennsylvania, a man who was sentenced to 
thirty-two months in prison for unlawfully exporting the same riflescopes as 
Pulungan, filed a motion to vacate his sentence due to ineffective 
counsel.162  Citing Pulungan, the movant claimed that his counsel failed to 
advise him that he could not be found guilty if he had no knowledge of the 
licensing requirement.163  The movant maintained that he pled guilty with 
the understanding that his lack of knowledge of the licensing requirement 
was irrelevant in his case.164   
In the Sixth Circuit, a retired professor from the University of Tennessee 
(UT), who is now infamous in the export control realm, utilized Pulungan 
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in his appeal.165  Professor Roth was convicted of violating the AECA by 
unlawfully exporting technical data and defense services.166  Roth 
transported a laptop containing controlled technical data to the People’s 
Republic of China and allowed two foreign national UT graduate students 
access to the data and a controlled research item.167  Both the data and the 
research item, a Force Stand designed to collect data, involved plasma 
technology for use on aircrafts.168  This seemingly innocent activity, 
traveling with a laptop and collaborating with graduate students, sounded 
alarms in university legal counsel offices across the country.  On appeal, 
Roth’s counsel cited Pulungan as persuasive authority to show that the jury 
instructions should have required that the defendant knew the items are on 
the Munitions List.169   
Notably, instead of relying on a DDTC assertion that the items are 
controlled as it did in Pulungan, the government introduced evidence 
detailing why the items fit the category of defense articles on the Munitions 
List.  This reveals the government’s recognition that it can no longer rely on 
the notion that DDTC decisions are unreviewable.  Citing Pulungan, the 
Sixth Circuit allowed judicial review of the DDTC determination that the 
technical data and Force Stand fit the category on the Munitions List.170  
Because the items were intended for military use, the court found the 
DDTC determination valid.171  The court opted for the broader definition of 
willfulness, only requiring knowledge that conduct was unlawful, and 
upheld Roth’s conviction.172 
In the First Circuit, which has previously applied a broad definition of 
willfulness for AECA violations, a district court declined to adopt the 
Pulungan knowledge requirement,173 but the court did entertain a vagueness 
challenge to the ITAR similar to Pulungan’s challenge.174  In United States 
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v. Wu, the jury convicted the defendants of violating the AECA.175  The 
defendants sought to vacate the verdict on the grounds that the regulations 
lacked sufficient notice and that the post-export application of the ITAR 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.176  In an as-applied 
challenge to the AECA for vagueness, the judge emphasized that when the 
military purpose of the items is not obvious, if the defendant was told or 
aware that the items at issue are controlled defense articles or services, then 
the regulations are not vague as-applied.177  The court granted the motions 
to set aside two counts of violating the AECA because the defendants only 
had notice that those particular items might be subject to the EAR, but not 
the ITAR.178  The court reasoned: 
While evidence of willfulness is closely related to due process 
issues in the case law, due process is not necessarily satisfied if a 
defendant has fair notice that a license may be required under 
one law, but is charged under another law that he had no notice 
he was violating.179   
The lack of sufficient notice, coupled with agency disagreement as to 
whether the EAR or ITAR governed the items, led to the court decision that 
Counts 2 and 3 violated both the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.180  As in Pulungan, the DDTC’s delayed designation made it 
difficult to prove the defendants’ knowledge. 
Unpredictability in agency designations exemplifies the need for export 
control reforms that include increased transparency and judicial review. 
Otherwise, the U.S. risks losing its economic edge in aviation and defense 
industries due to a crippling export control system. 
VI. Conclusion 
As part of President Obama’s export control reforms, the President 
created the Federal Export Enforcement Coordination Center to minimize 
enforcement agency conflicts.181 The most significant change is the 
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transition to a positive Munitions List.  If a positive list had existed prior to 
Pulungan’s attempted export, he would not have been able to make the 
argument that the Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescopes did not fit the category 
of “[r]iflescopes manufactured to military specifications.”182  This change 
will assist the DDTC because the agency will no longer falter by relying 
solely on an assertion to prove the item is controlled.  Instead, the item will 
be clearly included on the Munitions List.   
The President also indicated that the major control lists, the CCL and 
Munitions List, could potentially be consolidated.183  This consolidation 
could reduce confusion and jurisdictional disputes between agencies, 
eliminating the possibility of exporters inadvertently checking the wrong 
list. 
The inconsistent definitions of “willfully” in the AECA will still exist 
despite these sweeping reforms.  Without an amendment of the AECA, the 
mens rea requirement and penalties will remain the same, even with a 
positive Munitions List.  Although the reforms will make it easier for the 
government to prove willfulness, what evidence will be required is still 
open for debate.   
The transition to a positive Munitions List will be gradual and subject to 
controversy.  In the meantime, some circuit courts will allow judicial 
review of DDTC designations, while other circuits will defer to the agency 
as a matter of law.  The unpublished Munitions List designations will 
continue to risk ensnaring innocent individuals.  Consequently, newcomers 
to aviation and defense industries within the region should familiarize 
themselves with these changing regulations.  Until Congress or the 
Supreme Court addresses the present circuit split, the ambiguous 
regulations will potentially stifle the export of goods, reducing the 
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